Advanced Windows Kernel Exploitation: Deep Dive into 12 Critical Structures for Red Team & Blue Team Mastery
Widespread autonomous vehicle adoption amplifies cybersecurity stakes, where kernel-level exploits can hijack sensor fusion, navigation stacks, or actuator controls. This extended technical blog expands beyond VAD/PEB/IAT/Handle Tables to 12 interconnected Windows internals—each dissected with exploitation vectors, detection heuristics, mitigation stacks, and AV-specific attack surfaces. Drawing from real-world pwn2own exploits and ECU reverse engineering, defenders gain blueprints to harden next-gen mobility platforms.
Part 1: Memory Management Deep Dive
VAD Trees: Hierarchical Memory Tracking Exploits
Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) trees maintain per-process memory region metadata via balanced binary search trees rooted in EPROCESS->VadRoot. Each VAD node (MMVAD, PMVAD variants) stores StartVA, EndVA, uVadFlags (commit/protect attributes), and parent/left/right pointers for O(log n) lookups.
Exploitation Primitives:
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Left/Right Child Traversal: Begin at VadRoot, leak module base addresses by walking valid VADs (uVadFlags.Commit==1), bypass ASLR for ROP chain construction targeting LIDAR drivers.
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VAD Spraying: Allocate large executable regions via VirtualAlloc, force tree imbalance for predictable cave hunting.
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AV Impact: Inject shellcode into perception module memory, altering point cloud data for phantom obstacle generation.
Detection:
kd> !vad <EPROCESS> -K // Kernel debugger VAD dump
ETW Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process with VadNodeCreate/Delete callbacks
Mitigations: SMEP/SMAP enforcement, Control Flow Guard (CFG) bitmap validation, hypervisor-protected VAD integrity via EPT hooks.
MMIL Flink/Blink Lists: Paged Pool Manipulation
Memory Manager's Idle List (MMIL) links free paged pool blocks via Flink/Blink doubly-linked lists from nt!ExPoolFreeList. Attackers forge pool headers (PoolType, PoolTag) for UAF exploits.
Attack Chain:
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Exhaust paged pool via large allocations (ZwAllocateVirtualMemory loops).
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Trigger use-after-free on lookaside list overflow.
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Overwrite Flink/Blink for arbitrary kernel read/write, pivot to token stealing.
Blue Team Forensics: PoolMon.exe tag tracking (e.g., "MmLd" for loader sections), Volatility's poolscan plugin.
Section Objects: Shared Memory Backdoors
Section objects (via ZwCreateSection) map files/devices into multiple processes, leaking kernel objects across sandboxes. AV stacks sharing HDMap sections become persistence vectors.
Mitigation Stack: ObRegisterCallbacks for section access auditing, process-specific section namespaces.
Part 2: Process & Thread Internals
PEB & LdrpHashTable: Process Hollowing Evasion
PEB (Process Environment Block) at gs:60h embeds LdrpHashTable (0x18 bytes per DLL entry: DllBase, EntryPoint, SizeOfImage, FullDllName). Attackers null BeingDebugged (PEB+2), patch loader data for API unhooking.
Technical Breakdown:
typedef struct _PEB_LDR_DATA {
BYTE Reserved1[8];
PVOID Reserved2[3];
LIST_ENTRY InMemoryOrderModuleList; // Offset 0x10
} PEB_LDR_DATA, *PPEB_LDR_DATA;
Exploits: Doppelganging (transacted file sections), reflective DLL injection bypassing hash checks.
AV Hardening: PEB shadowing via user-mode callbacks, seccomp-like API whitelisting for autonomy threads.
ETHREAD & KTHREAD: Thread Hijacking Vectors
EPROCESS->ThreadListHead links ETHREADs, each containing Tcb.CrossThreadFlags and ApcState. QueueUserAPC exploits mutate thread contexts for priv-esc.
Detection Heuristic: ETW ThreadCreate events with anomalous StartAddress (non-ntdll.dll).
Token Structures: Privilege Escalation Blueprints
PRIMARY_TOKEN in EPROCESS->Token holds SID, privileges (SeDebugPrivilege), and integrity levels. DuplicateHandle + token stealing yields SYSTEM shell.
Forensic Artifact: !token <EPROCESS> in WinDbg reveals modified RestrictedSidCount.
Part 3: Dynamic Linking & API Resolution
IAT/EAT Mechanics: Hooking Persistence
Import Address Table (IAT) at PE optional header (0x80h offset) resolves DLL exports via EAT forwarder chains. LdrpInitializeThunk performs fixups during process init.
Unhooking Tactics:
NtUnmapViewOfSection(hModuleBase);
LdrLoadDll(L"ntdll.dll", 0, &UnicodeStr, &hNtdll);
memcpy(IAT_target, ntdll_base + offset, size);
Mitigations: Import Address Table shadowing, ETW ApiSetSchema tracing.
TLS Callbacks: Early Bird APC Injection
Thread Local Storage callbacks (.tls) execute pre-DllMain, ideal for AV AMS bypass before ETW instrumentation.
Part 4: Object Management & Handles
Handle Tables: Object Duplication Attacks
EPROCESS->ObjectTable indexes HandleTableEntry[HandleValue>>3] with GrantedAccess and Object Pointer. ObReferenceObjectByHandle leaks across boundaries.
| Exploit Technique | CVEs Exploited | Mitigation Layer |
|---|---|---|
| Handle Inheritance | CVE-2023-23415 | ObSetHandleAttributes (OBJ_INHERIT disabled) |
| spraying | Pool header overflow | Handle opacity via registry: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\kernel\DisableHandleOpacity
|
| Impersonation | Token dup chains | Protected Process Light (PPL) |
Enumeration Script:
Get-Process | ForEach { [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById($_.Id).HandleCount }
Object Manager: Named Object Squatting
\KnownDlls\ntdll.dll symbolic links vulnerable to DLL sideloading in AV firmware updates.
Part 5: Registry & File System Internals
CM_KEY_CONTROL_BLOCK: Hive Exposure
Registry hives mapped via CmpHiveListHead, exploitable for persistence (Run/RunOnce keys in autonomy config hives).
File Objects: VAD+Handle Leak Chains
FOB->FsContext overlays enable filter driver bypass for log tampering.
Part 6: AV-Specific Threat Model & Defenses
ECU Virtualization: Hypervisor Introspection
Type-2 hypervisors (QEMU/KVM analogs) expose EPT violations for VAD/PEB monitoring. Replay attacks on CAN bus demand attested boot chains.
Sensor Fusion Runtime Protection
LIDAR/RADAR point clouds in shared memory sections require CFI (Control Flow Integrity) via CET (Shadow Stack).
Zero-Trust Stack:
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Formal verification of kernel modules (e.g., seL4 microkernel ports).
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Runtime attestation with TPM 2.0 + VBS (Virtualization-Based Security).
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ML anomaly detection on handle creation rates.
Closing: Building Resilient AV Platforms
Mastering these 12 structures equips teams to thwart nation-state AV hacks, from Stuxnet-style VAD spraying to IAT-patched OTA updates. Integrate WinDbg scripting, Sysmon ETW, and Volatility3 for proactive hunting. Future posts dissect ARM64 equivalents and Rust kernel mitigations—subscribe for kernel-owned mobility security.
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